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I.  Introduction 
It is common to distinguish between democracy as a form of rule and as a value. However 
methods of assessing the democratic quality of political systems have not always been good 
at assessing democracy as a form of rule against standards that are explicitly and coherently 
developed from a clear idea of democracy as a value. Nor, have they always been based on 
a fully worked-out justification for why it is so important to evaluate democracy in the first 
place. As a result they have not always been fully fit-for-the-purpose and justified-by-the-
purpose. Indeed, this paper argues that many attempts at democracy assessment have 
been inhibited by what might be termed a ‘normative-empirical gap’ that, in turn, reflects a 
crude and infantile misunderstanding of the so-called fact-value distinction that has done 
great damage to the study of politics.  
Things only began to improve when David Beetham et al (2002) developed Democratic 
Auditing. As a method of assessing the democratic quality of democratic systems, 
Democratic Auditing was as self-confessedly evaluative and diagnostic in its judgements as 
it was cautious of claims to measure democracy, and, worse still, aggregate measures 
democracy. Subsequent methods – such as the Democracy Barometer and the Varieties of 
Democracy project – have tried to hold on to the idea that it is possible to score democratic 
performance, though, refreshingly and impressively, they have attempted to do that in a 
manner that accepts the core insight of Democratic Auditing:  namely, that democracy can 
only be assessed using a plurality of standards and values that are irreducible to one 
another (On their irreducibility see Christiano 2004 & 2008) and about which there is 
reasonable disagreement that cannot be resolved save by arbitrarily assuming some of the 
very norms and values that are in dispute (For more on ‘reasonable disagreement’ and why it 
implies a need to accept ‘value pluralism’ see Rawls 1993).  
At the end of the paper I suggest two further improvements that could be made to existing 
methods of democracy assessment. First, consideration should be given to using 
deliberative forums of randomly chosen citizens to assess the democratic quality of their 
political systems. Second, there is also a serious role for laboratory experiments in 
democracy assessment. Laboratory experiments can give us counterfactual data. In other 
words, they can tell us whether people would participate more, deliberate more, identify 
more and so on under different arrangements to those that exist right now. All that is useful 
to know, if democracy assessment is to be helpful and diagnostic, and, indeed, if it is to tell 
us whether systems are as democratic as they could be, not just in relation to existing 
arrangements, but also in relation to others that have not even been attempted.  
Since Robert Dahl (1971), numerous attempts have been made to design methods of 
measuring democracy. I include in those attempts all studies that propose indicators of 
democracy and means of scoring their indicators against qualitative and quantitative data 
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(Bertelsman; Democratic Audit; Freedom House; POLITY IV; Bollen 1980; Freedom House; 
Hadenius 1992; Beetham et al 2002; Economist Intelligence Unit 2007; Vanhanen 2008; 
Bühlmann et al 2011).  Yet, as with so much else that is involved in defining, justifying or 
realising democracy, attempts to measure it have provoked much disagreement. Different 
methods disagree on a) what indicators should be used; b) on how indicators should be 
scored; and c) on how the scores given to individual indicators should be combined into 
overall evaluations of the democratic quality of political systems (Bühlmann et al 2011 and 
Coppedge and Gerring 2012). One possible response is simply to welcome the failure. 
Maybe it just confirms the wisdom of Einstein’s observation that not everything that is 
worthwhile can be measured, and not everything that can be measured is worth measuring. 
In any case democracy would, arguably, not be democracy if there were not limits to how far 
it can be measured. If people are to be free to choose their own form of democracy for 
reasons and standards of their own, then there would also seem to be limits to how far 
democracy can be measured by standards that are universalisable and comparable across 
systems.  
However, I doubt that we can give up on attempts to measure democracy so easily. To the 
contrary, I want to argue here that democracy requires methods of assessing democracy. I 
first discuss what is involved in specifying indicators and measures of democracy (Section 
2). I then argue that democracies may need methods of assessing democracy for two 
reasons: first, they need to be able to assess the democratic quality of their own systems 
(Section 3), and, second, they may find it no less hard to avoid assessing the democratic 
quality of other political systems. (4). I then discuss what follows for the design of methods of 
assessment (Section 5), before making my own tentative suggestions for how existing 
methods of assessment might be further improved by involving citizens themselves in 
assessments and by using experiments to evaluate democracies ‘counterfactually’, or, in 
other words, to evaluate ‘democracies as they are’ against ‘democracies as they might be’ 
(Sections 6). Along the way, I illustrate my arguments with the example of the European 
Union, which has the advantage of raising the difficulties of evaluating the democratic quality 
of polities in a particularly acute form. 
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II.  Deriving Indicators 
I suspect that it is impossible to construct a set of indicators of democracy that everyone 
would agree. But that does not mean that it is impossible to identify a sound way of 
developing indicators. As Roy Sorensen argues (1992), much philosophy amounts to little 
more than a ‘thought experiment’ aimed at identifying what can and must be assumed if we 
are to maintain the overall coherence of a set of beliefs. Thus a simple thought experiment 
aimed at identifying indicators of democracy might defend a core definition of democracy and 
then identify indicators based on whatever is needed to deliver that core definition. In what 
follows, I illustrate how such a thought experiment might work. I cannot stress too strongly 
that the indicators I set out are illustrative only, aimed at giving the reader an idea of how 
indicators are typically framed in methods of assessing democracy. So, please, do not think 
that those who attempt democracy assessments do not already know that their indicators are 
but simplified and shorthand summaries of the broad requirements for democracy. As can be 
verified from the detailed descriptions of their methods (See especially Democratic Audit, 
Democracy Barometer and Varieties of Democracy) those who do democracy assessment 
are well aware that most of the hard work of specifying and operationalizing tests of 
democracy only begins with the identification of indicators. However, that caveat aside, I 
hope to show that even a crude and peremptory thought experiment in developing indicators 
from a core definition of democracy can give the reader a good idea of some of the 
possibilities and problems of making even the first and simplest steps towards developing an 
overall framework for evaluating the democratic quality of political systems.  
Assume, for example, that I wanted to defend a core definition of democracy as a) public 
control with b) political equality and c) individual rights to justification (The first two elements 
are variously proposed by Beetham, 1994: 27-8; Weale 1999: 14; Bohman 2007: 2. For 
individual rights to justification see Forst 2011). It does not matter whether the democratic 
ideal is maximally defined as one in which publics can author their own laws or minimally 
defined as one in which they can merely avoid arbitrary domination, in both cases publics will 
need some control over those who govern them. Were, however, the right to public control to 
be distributed unequally – maybe perhaps because some people have more votes than 
others – then, as David Estlund has observed, there would not be a straightforward rule of 
the people. Rather there would an element of rule of some of the people over others of the 
people (2008: 37). However, even, public control with political equality are insufficient, since 
controlling majorities of political equals would still owe all individuals justifications that 
decisions have, indeed, been taken in ways that bind them too. 
So, if my starting point is public control with political equality and individual rights to 
justification, what indicators of democracy might follow? 
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i) Rights. Habermas has famously argued that it makes no sense to see either democracy 
or rights as limiting the other. Rather, the only possibility is that we commit ourselves to both 
‘rights’ and ‘democracy’ through the very act of committing ourselves to the other (1996). So, 
if we wanted to frame an indicator that identified those rights that are needed if citizens are 
to exercise public control with political equality and individual rights to justification, it might 
come out something like this: 
Indicator 1. How far, how equally and how securely do citizens enjoy rights of free 
speech, association and assembly? 
ii) Voting. Voting may not, as Dewey put it, be enough for democracy (1999 [1927]). But it is 
also difficult to imagine democracy without it. Even deliberative democracy and processes of 
justification may require systems of voting as closure devices needed to take pro tem 
decisions pending the emergence of discursively ideal conditions (Habermas, 1996: 177). 
Yet, public control with political equality puts limits on the forms that voting can take. Public 
control requires that those who are to be rewarded or sanctioned should not be in a position 
to administer systems of voting to their own advantage. Political equality requires that all 
citizens should have the same number of votes and each vote should count equally. Thus 
the following indicator is proposed here. 
Indicator 2. How far and how equally can citizens exercise public control through free 
and fair voting? 
iii) Representation. Given the spatio-temporal constraints of politics, citizens are only likely 
to be able to achieve public control with political equality and individual rights to justification 
through representatives (Dahl 1970: 67-8, Plotke 1997). Moreover, if democracy is the only 
form of legitimate power that is available to liberal societies that are committed to the view 
individuals are free and equal, then all forms of public power must ultimately be within the 
control of freely elected representative institutions. As J.S. Mill put it, there is ‘great variety’ in 
ways in which representative bodies can exercise controlling powers. Yet that power they 
must ultimately have ‘in its entirety’, or, in other words, over all institutions of government 
(Mill 1972 [1861] 228-9). That might imply the following indicator: 
Indicator 3. How far can representatives elected by the people require all public 
bodies to justify their actions and exercise ultimate controlling power over them? 
iv) Choice. Publics could have the formal power to elect representatives as equals without 
enjoying much choice of either leaders or politices, or without there being much by way of a 
competition for the peoples’ vote (Schattsneider 1960) that connects them to their 
representatives through processes that ensure authorisation, accountability (Pitkin 1967), 
justification (Forst promising, anticipation or selection (Mansbridge 2003 & 2010). This 
suggests a need for the following indicator: 
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Indicator 4. How far does competition for the people’s vote structure voter choice in 
ways that allow citizens to exercise public control as equals? 
v) Civil Society. Publics could have formal powers to elect representatives and even wide 
choice in who they can elect and yet be arbitrarily constrained in their political choices by 
other social and economic relations. Here liberal democracy presupposes a delicate balance 
(Bauman, 1999: 154-5). On the one hand it requires that the political system should not be 
able to dominate the very society by which it is supposed to be controlled. Yet, that civil 
society must, in turn, be regulated by the political system so that no source of private power 
can gain unequal access or otherwise interfere with procedures that allow publics to govern 
themselves as equals. That might imply something like the following indicator:  
Indicator 5. How plural and independent are social groups, organised interests and 
communications media that seeks to influence the polity? How equal is their access 
to public institutions? 
vi) Public sphere. As seen, even majorities of equals owe all other individuals justifications 
that collectively binding decisions have been made without arbitrariness and in ways that do, 
indeed, oblige all.  Thus John Stuart Mill wrote of a need for a Congress of Opinions where 
all points of view can present themselves ‘in the light of day’ to be ‘tested against one 
another’, and where those who are over-ruled can ‘feel satisfied that [their opinion has been] 
heard’, and not ‘set aside by a mere act of will’ (Mill, 1972 [1861]: 239-40). Moreover, an 
informal and spontaneous public sphere in which public opinion plays much the same role 
may be quite as important here as deliberation by formally elected bodies in the course of 
legislation (Fraser 1991). All this might imply the following indicator:  
Indicator 6. How far are the decisions of the polity deliberated within a public sphere 
that allows all points of view to be considered, justified and decided in relation to all 
others, free of inequalities in power and resources? 
vii) Civic Capabilities. Even representation requires some participation by citizens in voting, 
deliberation and will formation. Democracy cannot, therefore, be a costless form of 
government, without burdens of citizenship that cannot be met by citizens who do not have 
a) a social capital of trust in democratic politics and one another and b) civic capabilities that 
include basic knowledge of the political system and an ability to receive and demand 
justifications (March and Olsen, 1995). Hence, the following indicator is proposed here: 
Indicator 7.  How far and how equally do citizens a) trust one another and b) enjoy 
civic capabilities needed to exercise public control, and demand and receive 
justifications? 
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viii) Rule of Law. The relationship between law and democracy often appears perplexing. 
Citizens must be able to control their own laws as equals. Yet the law also needs to 
guarantee the process of democratic majority formation itself from this or that majority. 
Something like this balance is expressed in the following indicator: 
Indicator 8. How far are democratic majorities constrained by a rule of law that is no 
more constraining than is necessary to protect the process of majority formation 
itself? 
ix) Demos. Finally, agreement is needed on who should have votes and voice in processes 
designed to secure public control with political equality and individual rights to justification. 
This suggests a final indicator as follows: 
Indicator 9. How far is the polity accepted as a unit that can use democratic 
procedures to make collectively binding decisions?  
So far then, I have sketched nine very general indicators of democracy. However we are not 
finished yet by a long way.  First, any attempt to derive indicators from a core definition of 
democracy can only yield generic indicators that are both under-determined and over-
determined. Several further conditions may be needed to satisfy them, or, alternatively, it 
may be possible to satisfy them in more than one way. Consider Table 1 (see Annex). The 
first column simply summarises the indicators I have already sketched. The second and third 
columns then use two of the Recon models developed by Erik Eriksen and John-Erik 
Fossum (2012) to show how, in the case of the European Union, my indicators would need 
to be specified in very different ways, depending on whether the aim is to control the Union 
through the democratic institutions of its member states or through its own democratic 
institutions.  
Second, even when indicators have been developed with sufficient precision, methods of 
democracy assessment obviously need to be able to specify and justify what should count as 
a good, bad or indifferent level of performance against each indicator. No amount of 
empirical data can on its own answer the question what justifies a decision to count one 
threshold rather than another as ‘good enough’? Moreover those benchmarks can, in turn, 
be ideal, feasible or comparative, as I will discuss further below. 
Third, once scores have been given to individual indicators, a decision needs to be taken on 
how, if at all, individual indicators should be combined to reach an overall evaluation of a 
political system. This is anything but straightforward. Some indicators may be so basic that a 
country that fails to satisfy them can hardly count as democratic at all. Other indicators may 
be more safely traded off against one another. (Lord 2004; Coppedge and Gerring 2011: 
250).  
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III. Why democracies need to be able to assess themselves 
Now that I have illustrated indicators that are typically used in democracy assessments, I can 
ask what justifies attempts to assess the democratic quality of political systems? On the one 
hand, democracies may need to be able to assess themselves. Consider the view that self-
rule can only be self-rule where publics can make choices between forms of democracy. 
James Bohman endorses this view when he argues that ‘democracy is that set of institutions 
by which individuals are empowered as free and equal citizens to form and change the terms 
of their collective life together, including democracy itself’ (2007:2). Richard Bellamy likewise 
argues that ‘for democracy to mean “people rule”, the demos should be free to redefine the 
nature of their democracy whenever they want and not be tied to any fixed definition’ (2007: 
90). Of course, there are some who might question just how far publics ever get to choose 
whole social and political systems. However, I take it that even those who believe that 
bricolage or incremental adjustment is as much as can be expected, would at least agree 
that publics should, as Philip Pettit puts it, be able to  ‘invigilate’ democratic systems (2008: 
53). 
So what, if anything, does all this imply for methods of assessing democracy? If publics are, 
at the very least, to be able to invigilate the democratic quality of their polities, they will 
presumably need to able to diagnose difficulties. Still, it might be objected, that diagnosis 
often works well enough with a common sense understanding of political systems. ‘Scientific’ 
methods of assessing democracy are therefore surplus to requirement. I think there are two 
answers to this objection. 
First the causes of democratic deficiencies may be anything but obvious to ‘visual 
inspection’. Where shortcomings result from complex forms of causation in which different 
institutions and practices interact to produce problems, scientific methods may be the only 
way of diagnosing those difficulties correctly. An example that goes right to the heart of 
democracy assessment – since it tests the motivational force of democracy and specific 
democracies - is the problem of participation in elections. Detailed surveys that carefully 
distinguish between voters, voluntary abstainers, involuntary abstainers and a wide range of 
possible motives for each of those behaviours can a) test for counter-intuitive causes that 
are less than obvious to common sense understandings, b) rank those causes and c) 
analyse how they combine. For example, a survey by Jean Blondel and others (1998) asked 
voters and non-voters in European elections a series of questions about the powers of Union 
institutions. Contrary to received wisdom about second-order European elections, it turned 
out that both voters and non-voters in European elections believed that the European 
Parliament was important, and they did so in almost equal numbers. If there was a feature of 
the Union’s institutional design that could explain low voter participation, the survey 
concluded that it was the dispersion of powers between the Union’s institutions and the 
national and European levels, not a perception that the EP does not matter.  
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Second, Thomas Christiano (2008) has convincingly argued that democratic procedure 
needs to allow for overwhelming evidence of systematic biases in human judgement (See 
esp. Kahnemann 2012). The same might be said for methods of assessing democracy. What 
looks like a democratic surplus or deficit to one person can look like its opposite to another. 
Again, an example from the study of the EU illustrates the point. Much of the controversy 
about democracy and the EU in recent years has revolved around an exchange in which 
Andreas Føllesdal and Simon Hix (2006) disputed attempts by Andrew Moravcsik (2002) and 
Giandomenico Majone (2005) to question whether the EU really suffers from a democratic 
deficit. To their considerable credit the protagonists in the debate start out from clearly 
defined understandings of democracy. Still, the fact remains that where they end up depends 
a good deal on where they start out. Moravcsik tells us that ‘the classic justification for 
democracy is to check and channel arbitrary power’ (2002: 6).  Small wonder, then, he feels 
that multiple checks on Union power are reason to question how far it is in democratic deficit. 
In contrast, Føllesdal and Hix affirm Schattsneider’s view that democracy ‘is a competitive 
political system in which competing leaders and organisations define the alternatives of 
public policy in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-process’ (2006: 
547). A framework of indicators that encompassed a variety of understandings of democracy 
would make it clearer that contributors to the Føllesdal-Hix-Majone-Moravcsik debate do not 
prove or disprove the democratic deficit. They merely discuss it from particular points of 
view. Better still, wide use of such a framework would require contributors to the debate not 
merely to stipulate their own preferred definitions but to say why they are preferable to the 
alternatives. Indicators can therefore have a role in relativising claims about democratic 
performance, making them explicit and rendering them accountable.  
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IV. Why democracies need to be able to assess the 
democratic quality of other states. 
In addition to being able to assess themselves, democracies may also need to be able to 
assess the quality of democracy in other countries. In practice they have often done that in 
the belief that development aid or membership of international organisations should be 
conditional upon how far states are prepared to commit themselves to democratisation. Yet it 
is easy to feel some disquiet here. Assessing the democratic quality of other states needs to 
be justified if it is not to be a gross impertinence. Of course it is possible that the quality of 
any one democracy is enough of a shared concern even to justify its assessment by 
outsiders, perhaps for following reasons: 
First, democracy may be an international public good. To the extent that democracies are 
unlikely to threaten other democracies, the international system will enjoy greater peace and 
stability in proportion to the number of countries that are democracies. Indeed, democracies 
are more likely to have democracies as neighbours (Starr 1991), suggesting, perhaps, some 
kind of positive externality whereby it is just a whole lot easier to sustain democracy within a 
state when the neighbours are doing the same. 
Second, some democracies do not just share a neighbourhood with others, they have also 
signed up to elements of shared rule with other states. In the case of the European Union, 
once a shared policy has been agreed, no one member state can easily exit it, or even 
amend it, on its own. As Fritz Scharpf has eloquently pointed out, consensus decision-rules 
can only work ‘first time round’ to guarantee that individual national democracies will not be 
arbitrarily dominated by other member states  (Scharpf 2009). Thereafter member states are 
more likely to be locked into existing policies under consensus decision-rules, as opposed to 
simply majority voting. Thus, in a whole series of matters of great importance to the 
individual life chances of one another’s citizens, and to the authoritative allocation of values 
in one another’s societies, member states have in effect locked themselves into a shared 
rule that depends, in part, on the democratic quality of each other member state. As Jan 
Werner Müller has put it, ‘Every European Citizen has an interest in not been faced with an 
illiberal member state in the EU. After all, that state will make decisions in the European 
Council, and, therefore, in at least an indirect way, govern the lives of all citizens’ (Müller 
2013: 12). He might have added that each Member State has votes in the Council, seats in 
the Parliament, and the power to appoint one Commissioner and one Judge in the Court of 
Justice of the European Union. Each of these contributes to decisions that are collectively 
binding on all member states. 
Third, even where they do not participate in elements of shared rule, democratic systems 
famously pose ‘insider-outsider’ problems. In many cases, there is an incongruence between 
‘all those affected’ by their decisions and ‘all those included’ in their making. This has a 
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disturbing implication: the more efficient democracies are at encouraging forms of political 
competition that maximise the given preferences of voters internally, the more likely they are 
to produce negative externalities for all other societies (Grant and Keohane 2005). Moreover 
the problem will be systemic to the extent that any political party that foregoes opportunities 
to secure benefits for voters on the inside, at the expense of affected outsiders, will risk 
being out-competed. Christian Joerges has even termed this a ‘constitutional defect’ of the 
democratic state (2006. See also Joerges and Neyer 1997). The systemic character of the 
problem may mean that it can only be solved institutionally, that is, by states contracting 
together – under adequate commitment technologies – not to produce negative externalities 
(Lord 2011). However, even, if for example, James Bohman is correct when he claims it may 
be sufficient for affected outsiders to have rights to put their concerns on the agendas of 
other political systems and have them considered seriously (Bohman 2007), even that 
possibly modest proposal would imply that outsiders have fairly significant justified interests 
in the standards of systems other than their own: in how free and equal those other systems 
are in allowing access to the their political agenda and in their standards of deliberation.  
Strictly speaking, though, the need for democracies to assess the democratic quality of other 
states does not depend on ‘democratic conditionality’ or ‘democratic peace’ or participation in 
limited forms of ‘shared rule’ or ‘mutual affectedness’. Even if none of these problems 
existed, democracies would still need reliable means of distinguishing democracies from 
non-democracies. This is because democracies need to assess democracy in other 
countries in order to decide their own behaviour (Rawls 1999) and not just on account of any 
interest they might have in the behaviour of others. Democracies have certain duties – of 
respect and of constraint - to other democracies that follow from a need to avoid 
contradicting the very principles that legitimate their own political systems. Democracies can 
hardly claim that they are legitimate because they allow individuals to govern themselves as 
free and equal without having a duty to respect as legitimate the decisions of other 
democracies that result from their own attempts to govern themselves as political 
communities of free and equal individuals. Since, moreover, the aim here is presumably to 
be seen to act towards other democracies in ways that maintain the overall credibility and 
legitimacy of democratic rule, democratic governments are presumably constrained in how 
they can categorise other systems as democratic or non-democratic on no other basis than 
their own caprice and convenience, and without regard for the credibility of their 
assessments. Access to reliable and defensible methods of democracy assessment is one 
way of ensuring that credibility. 
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V.  Democracy Assessment and the collapse of the fact/value 
distinction. 
I have argued that democracy needs to be able to assess democracy. That puts a heavy 
responsibility on the academic study of politics whose main two main branches - political 
philosophy and analytical political science – are often insufficiently integrated to provide 
everything that is needed if democracies are to assess democracy, or so I will argue in this 
section. In many ways, the problem began with the ‘turn’ that the study of politics took in 
order to become an analytical science that focuses on the analysis of causation rather than 
normative appraisal. As Guy Peters has pointed out, the ‘behavioural revolution’ that 
purported to found a ‘new political science’ in the 1950s explicitly professed an ‘anti-
normative bias’ (1999: 13) that aimed to convert the study of politics into a value-free 
science.  
Yet, well before political scientists embraced the fact-value distinction, philosophers 
themselves had begun to demolish it. Robert Brandom demonstrates that ‘to be able to 
make any claims at all’ –empirical ones included - ‘one must already know how to do 
everything necessary to deploy...normative vocabulary’. We can only make a claim if we are 
also prepared to commit to all that follows from that claim, to warrant that we are entitled to 
the claim, and to accept responsibility for repairing any inconsistencies between that one 
claim and each and every other belief we endorse. As he puts it, ‘The unity of discursive 
commitments is a normative unity: a matter of taking responsibility for one’s commitments by 
acknowledging what else they commit and entitle one to...In so far as one falls short of those 
ideals, one is normatively obliged to do something about it, to repair the failure’ (Brandom 
2008: 115 & 187). What though of the converse, namely, the difficulty of making normative 
claims without also making empirical ones. In his comments on both Brandom and Hilary 
Putnam, Habermas points out that normative claims plainly do not depend on empirical 
claims in the case of categorical imperatives. The whole point of categorical imperatives is 
that they are binding come what may (Habermas 2003, chaps 3 & 5). Yet plainly that is not 
the case with hypothetical imperatives, whose whole point is precisely that their normative 
force does depend on states of the world. In their case ‘ought’ really does imply can’, or at 
least it does for any one attempting to be ‘non-utopian’ (Weale 1999). In so far as many of 
the values we commit ourselves to in democratic politics take the form of hypothetical 
imperatives, democracy assessment can only work by collapsing the fact value distinction. It 
has unavoidably to make assumptions of both value and of fact: to work out what standards 
follow from democratic values and, at the same time, to specify over what states of the world 
– under what factual conditions – those standards hold.  I will discuss two important 
examples later. 
Whilst many political scientists are well aware of the limitations of positivist aspirations to a 
value-free social science, earlier attempts to insist on the fact-value distinction have had a 
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lasting effect on how the study of politics is organised and on its capacity to mobilise and 
combine all the methodologies that are needed to investigate some of the most important 
questions of politics. Robert Putnam has put the problem thus: 
Rigorous appraisals of institutional performance are rare, even though defining and 
accounting for “good government” was once at the top of our predecessors’ agenda, 
when they founded the discipline of political science at the end of the last century. Over 
the last forty years, however, the undeniable admixture of normative judgements in 
these inquiries… has made most empirical political scientists reluctant to pursue them: 
de gustibus non disputandum est, at least in a value-free political science (1993: 63). 
Indeed, of all things in the study of politics, attempts to assess the democratic quality of 
politics must be a prime example of something that can only work by bridging the fact-value 
distinction, not by insisting upon it. This is easily illustrated by distilling everything that has 
been said so far in the paper into four conditions that any method of democracy assessment 
will need to be able to satisfy.  
A): Justifiability. All of the key decisions that need to be taken in designing any method of 
assessing democracy – the definition, weighting, interpretation and scoring of indicators – 
need to be based on an understanding of why democracy should be valued in the first place. 
Let me give a huge example. It is often said that freedom and equality jointly form the core 
values of democracy. Yet freedom and equality are valued by different people for different 
reasons. Republicans famously differ from liberals in how far they believe that freedom is 
merely a ‘negative’ liberty from non-interference as opposed to a ‘positive’ liberty to 
participate in shared processes aimed at self-rule, will-formation or definition and deliberation 
of standards of non-domination. Social democrats famously differ from liberals in how far 
they believe that political equality also requires social and economic equality. Those who 
belong to these different schools of thought would be unlikely to be satisfied with the same 
indicators of democracy, nor would they be likely to score the same indicators in the same 
way. 
B): Empirical verifiability. By now it should be obvious that democracy assessment is a 
judgement first and a measurement second. It is only possible to turn to questions of 
measurement after judgements have been made about indicators, their weights and what 
should count as satisfaction of them. But that does not mean that measurements are 
unimportant. Methods of assessing democracy can be only as meaningful as the conditions 
that validate them. Methods must allow those using them to demonstrate that they are 
entitled to reach the assessments they do. Yet entitlement to an assessment will often be 
impossible without complex causal analysis. Assessments need to demonstrate that any 
qualities and defects they identify are systematic, and not accidental, features of the 
institutions being evaluated. They also need to attribute qualities and defects correctly by 
demonstrating exactly which institutions and practices are responsible for them. In sum then, 
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democracy assessment can no more do without the state-of-the-art methods of identifying 
causation that have been developed by analytical political science than it can manage 
without state-of-the-art political philosophy to justify its standards. 
C): Universalisability. Whilst it is important that standards should accommodate different 
reasons for valuing democracy, it plainly cannot be the case that democracy is just what 
anyone says it is. One possible solution may be to conceive democracy as a ‘boundedly 
contested concept’, as opposed to an ‘essentially contested’ one (Lord 2004: 12-3). This 
would allow for varieties of democracy so long as they only vary within the bounds of what is 
needed to provide some means of realising core requirements. So, for example, it could be 
that any one system has to provide public control with political equality and individual rights 
to justification in some way that can be left to it to decide. I take it that Bohman has 
something similar in mind so far as he argues that each people should be free to choose its 
own form of democracy, and, yet, there is, none the less, a ‘democratic minimum’ that 
everyone has to observe (2007). That, however, plainly begs the question of what should be 
the universal components of standards and what should be the particular, optional and 
variable ones. I shall come back to this.  
D): Plurality and sensitivity of reasonable disagreement in democratic values. Methods 
of assessing democracy need to be sensitive to reasonable disagreement in beliefs about 
democracy. There may be some disagreements about democracy to which there are no 
solutions that do not assume the superiority of just some of the very beliefs that are in 
dispute. Indeed, the indicators employed by the two most commonly used methods of 
democracy assessment - Freedom House and POLITY IV - are often criticised precisely on 
the grounds that they arbitrarily assume understandings of freedom and equality that many 
people do not share (Coppedge and Gerring 2011; Bühlmann et al 2012). 
Of course it is not hard to see how the foregoing requirements might form an ‘impossible 
quartet’. A) and B) may clash where indicators based on ideals of freedom, equality, political 
community and so on turn out to be hard to realise or to verify. C) and D) may clash where 
reasonable disagreement about democratic values leaves little scope for tests that can be 
universalised and compared across political systems. As it happens, both these problems 
can be solved, but, crucially, not by any one who believes in the fact-value distinction. Here 
is why. 
It may help start the discussion of the first dilemma – between the ideal and the feasible – by 
returning to the example of the indicators that might be used to evaluate the democratic 
quality of the European Union. Consider the choice between the indicators set out in 
columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 (see Annex). Part of the choice between them is plainly one of 
value. Thus Giandomenico Majone’s argument that publics have shown no great wish to 
associate together at the European level as a single democratic people when offered the 
opportunity to do so through European elections (2005) might suggest a value preference for 
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political community at the national level. Even, however, if that is a majority view, it may not 
be a monopoly view. It is plainly conceivable that some people might even value associating 
together at the European level in a Union polity with individuals from other EU countries.  
Yet both sides in the debate also face a massive problem of feasibility that makes it hard to 
say that the choice between the models of democracy in columns 2 and 3 is just one of 
value. The problem of feasibility faced by those who value democracy at the European level 
might be summarised as follows. If a political system is to be democratic, it may, as we have 
seen, have to satisfy a long and demanding set of conditions, such as: a) freedoms of 
speech and association; b) free and fair elections; c) appointment of the legislature and 
leading executive positions by popular vote; d) a form of political competition that offers 
voters choices relevant to the control of the political system; e) a civil society in which all 
groups have equal opportunity to organise to influence the polity; f) a public sphere in which 
all opinions have equal access to public debate and g) a defined demos; or, in other words, 
agreement on who should have votes and voice in the making of decisions binding on all. 
Yet, achieving all these conditions simultaneously may be hard in any institution that 
operates beyond the state and is not, therefore, itself a state. The capacity of the state to 
concentrate power, resources and legal enforcement has been useful in all kinds of ways to 
democracy (Scheuerman 2009): in ensuring that the decisions of democratic majorities are 
carried out; in guaranteeing rights needed for democracy; in drawing the boundaries of 
defined political communities; in motivating voters and elites to participate in democratic 
competition for the control of an entity which manifestly affects their needs and values. 
On the other hand, those who put intrinsic value on controlling the Union through the political 
communities and democratic institutions of each member state also face a problem of 
feasibility. A somewhat stylized version of their feasibility problem might be stated as follows. 
Many of the important systems on which modern life depends - not least ecological and 
financial systems - require international bodies that are powerful enough to control negative 
externalities, provide public goods, and avoid moral hazard. If, however, any one member 
state has an interest in doing any of those wicked things, then so presumably will its 
electorate and parliament. Thus, assuming that at least part of the point of co-operating at 
the European level is to solve collective action problems, then attempts to control the Union 
through the democratic institutions of its member states will be self-defeating (On this see 
also Lindseth 2010). Indeed, to insist that is the only way of controlling the Union 
democratically is to remove from publics the option of deciding to solve a range of collective 
action problems that may have huge implications for their own lives. 
So, on both sides of the debate, we can see how democratic values might run up against 
serious problems of feasibility. What is to be done? Hilary Putnam, has argued that where 
facts conflict with values, it is by no means self-evident that we should always try to change 
the facts, rather than abandon particular values (2004). At first, this might seem a little 
shocking. But that would be a misunderstanding. On the one hand values are themselves 
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held within frameworks of values and of assumptions about the facts of politics and society. 
Even where we adjust particular values to fit particular assumptions of fact we have to do 
that in a way that maintains coherence – or in Rawlsian terms, a reflective equilibrium (1993) 
- between the whole. Indeed, these adjustments must themselves be justified. Methods of 
democracy assessment should themselves be able to discern cases where second-best or 
non-ideal standards have been adopted in a reasoned and justified way and where they 
have not. Likewise it should be able to discriminate cases where shortcomings in democratic 
systems that arise in the course of delivering other democratic standards from those that do 
not. The former are ‘compensated’ losses. The latter are pure losses. By definition, ‘second-
best’ judgements such as these plainly involve careful analysis of ideals and of what are 
justifiable trade-offs between them under different empirical constraints. Evaluating how far 
democracy does its best in a bad world – or just under sub-optimal conditions – simply 
cannot be done from within the fact-value distinction and without abandoning disciplinary 
boundaries between political philosophy and analytical political science that assume that 
distinction.   
What, though, of the tension between C) and D), that is, between the need for 
universalisable and plural standards? It seems to me that this difficulty has been greatly 
exaggerated by a failure to realise that there is a huge ‘excluded middle’ in arguments that 
suppose that a choice has to be made between ‘imposing’ standards on particular 
democracies from the outside and accepting a hopeless relativism in which any one polity 
can only be evaluated by whatever standards ‘insiders’ define for themselves. 
The obvious way in which the excluded middle can be filled is where those inside polities 
themselves accept the validity of external appraisal. It seems to me there is an important 
reason why precisely that often happens in our contemporary world. Even democracies 
have, as it were, ended up in a ‘state of nature’ which their citizens have good reason to 
want to exit. In other words, many national democracies have found themselves in what is in 
some ways an intolerably ‘under-governed’ – or at least insufficiently governed – condition. 
As discussed earlier, what Habermas calls an insufficiently governed globalisation 
(Habermas 2013: 55) means that democracies are able to impose negative externalities on 
one another. Yet, they are sometimes unable to provide some positive externalities – or 
public goods – which their citizens may consider important to security, welfare or justice.  
In so as it is accepted that this ‘democratic state of nature’ is best exited by agreeing rules 
that regulate how far democracies can impose negative externalities and by forming clubs 
that allow them to co-operate to provide positive externalities, members of national 
democracies also, to some extent, accept that their own internal standards of governance 
are no longer just a matter of internal concern. Whether their own internal standards show 
sufficient regard for the negative externalities they may create for other democracies – and 
for the likelihood that each club they have formed with other democracies really will be able 
to co-operate as agreed to provide positive externalities without cheating, free-riding or moral 
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hazard - must be a matter on which those other democracies must be permitted an opinion if 
rules for regulating externalities really are to be shared rules based on principles of mutual 
respect and good neighbourliness between democracies. So, it seems to me, that agreeing 
to co-operate with others to manage externalities can imply accepting the validity of external 
appraisal where that task is itself significantly affected by internal standards of governance.  
However, that is unlikely to convince those who believe that external appraisal of political 
systems is often misguided, impertinent and sometimes even illegitimate because it ignores 
the cultural specificity of societies and their right to govern themselves according to 
standards they give themselves in view of that cultural-specificity. Yet, as Rainer Forst points 
out, those who ‘claim cultural integrity’ affirm at least one universal standard: namely, one to 
‘cultural specificity’ (2011: 215). So, they cannot claim to be against the very idea of universal 
standards. Moreover, murderers and thieves presumably cannot be allowed to ward off 
external criticism by arbitrarily claiming that there is just the one universal right in the world – 
namely, one to cultural specificity – and not others that are less convenient to them, such as 
a right to a life and a living. Indeed, the right to cultural specificity may itself depend on a 
whole series of correlative rights if it is not to be abused and captured by power-holders. 
Hence, cultural specificity may even be better protected where externally defined rights and 
standards can be taken up by internal oppositions (Cohen 2012: 16). External standards that 
are used in that way are internally employed within a specific culture, not externally imposed.      
Indeed, the claim to a right to cultural specificity itself illustrates something that is common to 
concepts of rights: namely, that in any political community where there is even the sparsest 
concept of rights owed to all human beings, there cannot but be a mutual implication 
between the universal and the particular. A polity cannot hold beliefs that there are some 
rights owed to all human beings and yet fail to give those beliefs concrete form in its own 
institutions and laws. Yet, the more its own justification rests on its own beliefs about rights 
owed to all, and not just on its own particular instantiation of those rights, the more a polity 
itself accepts the legitimacy of appraisal and comparison by all. Such polities are thus 
already committed – by their own claims – to the idea that there are at least some practices 
that need to be justified both “internally” and “externally” (Forst 2011: 227). If insiders 
themselves aim, even in small part, to convince others of the quality of their own systems, 
they themselves accept the need to give justifications for the internal quality of their own 
systems that are capable of convincing others that do not belong to those systems.  
The obvious middle way between giving either outsiders or insiders complete say over 
standards for assessing democracy is to establish those standards through a process of 
mutual justification between insiders and outsiders. Now, to be a ‘complete dialogue’, that 
would presumably need to be a dialogue about values, the weighting of values and the 
application of values, which, of course, presupposes some empirical understanding of the 
circumstances of each polity and society. So, just as externalities between democracies 
require attention to the empirical circumstances of inter-democracy interdependence in 
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setting standards for the evaluation of any one democracy, the empirical circumstances of 
any one society need to be taken into account in deciding how more general standards of 
democracy should be applied to any one polity. In neither case can standards for assessing 
the democratic quality of political systems be fully determined without assumptions of both 
fact and value.  
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VI. Two concluding suggestions 
Specifying particular democratic values, possibilities and difficulties of realising them under 
given empirical conditions, trade-off relationships between them, and the claims of insiders 
and outsiders on the standards of any one democracy are all as important to justifying 
methods by which democracies are assessed as they are to the design of democracy itself. 
These are only judgements that can be made by collapsing the fact-value distinction not by 
insisting upon it. Attempts to evaluate the democracy quality of political systems without 
being aware that there are different reasons for valuing democracy are unlikely to succeed. 
Nor are attempts that ignore a need to combine judgements of value and of fact.  
Two recent projects have acknowledged all this. The Democracy barometer seeks to go 
beyond minimalist frameworks which may be able to distinguish ‘democracies from non-
democracies’ but which are seriously limited in their ability to assess established 
democracies by a failure to acknowledge that democracy can be a ‘complex phenomenon’ of 
freedom, quality and of forms of control needed to deliver those standards (See 
democracybarometer.org/concept-en.html last accessed 29 March 2015). Likewise the 
impressive new Varieties of Democracy (VIDEM) project allows for the essential value 
pluralism of democracy by including liberal, participatory, deliberative and egalitarian 
components (Coppedge et al 2014). In both cases, normative sensitivity to the diversity of 
values and justifications for democracy is combined with sophisticated proposals for scoring 
democratic practice against plural standards 
Yet, democracy assessment does not just require good political philosophy and good political 
science. It also requires citizens too. David Beetham makes the point well in his defence of 
his own approach of democratic auditing:  
‘There are a number of significant differences between the idea of a democratic audit and 
other methods of democracy assessment. Where the others involve outsiders sitting in 
judgement on another country or countries, a democratic audit is undertaken as a domestic 
project by citizens of the country being assessed, as part of an internal debate about the 
character of political institutions and public life. This does not mean that there is no external 
or comparative reference point for the criteria and standards employed – indeed, such a 
reference point is essential – but that the assessments being made involve local expertise 
and critical judgement, and form part of an internal political debate, rather than an externally 
defined agenda… In a democratic audit, the final responsibility for the judgements made is a 
domestic one’ (1999: 568).  
Indeed, in the future it may be helpful to include a place in democracy assessment for 
randomly-selected deliberative forums of citizens themselves. Yet, in addition even to that, it 
seems to me there is a role for experimentation, as well as deliberation, in resolving complex 
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questions about the use of standards in democracy assessments. Here I really do mean 
controlled experiments under laboratory conditions. Just how that would be done requires 
another paper. It is enough here to note that philosophers have recently used laboratory 
experiments to test what real people think about a number of questions that are at least as 
abstract as beliefs about democratic standards, including questions of justice (Frohlich & 
Oppenheimer 1992), ethics (Appiah 2008), consciousness (Knobe and Prinz 2008) and free 
will (Nichols 2011).  
Nearly a century ago John Dewey asked ‘shall our political philosophy be experimental, or 
shall it be a priori?’  (Boydston 1979: 415)? As this implies using experiments to test what 
real people think about standards is a reality check on the aprioristic assumptions of 
philosopher kings. However, it also models the reality that standards evolve experimentally. 
People commit themselves to standards through their everyday experiments in convincing 
others, solving problems and coping with the world. Now it could be that we could discover 
how people seem to commit themselves to standards in their everyday language (Searle 
2010: 87) and behaviour by just observing the everyday operation of the political process.  
However, Eleanor Ostrom - who devoted a large part of her research to using experiments to 
test the conditions under which people are prepared to accept norms and institutions in order 
to solve collective action problems – once pointed out that a great limitation of just observing 
the political process is that the latter may only get to consider a narrow range of the different 
ways in which institutions could be designed (Ostrom 1998). In an ideal world, we would be 
able to vary each of the many different ways in which institutions could be designed in a 
controlled manner – changing just one attribute at a time – to gain a complete picture of how, 
for example, people’s beliefs about democratic standards vary over the range of institutional 
choices available to them. Controlled experiments can do that. Mere observation of the 
political process cannot (See also Druckman et al 2006).  
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VII. Annex 
Table 1. Illustrative Indicators. 
 
1. Generic Indicator 2.  How the contribution of national democracies to indicators in 
column 1 could be appraised. 
3. How the contribution of Union institutions to 
indicators in column 1 could be appraised. 
How far, how equally and how securely do citizens enjoy 
rights of free speech, association and assembly? 
National freedoms of speech, association and assembly are 
available to domestic publics in their control of powers delegated 
to the EU. 
Union-wide guarantees of freedoms of speech, 
association and assembly in each Member State. 
How far and how equally can citizens exercise public 
control through free and fair voting? 
 
Free and fair elections to national executive and legislative offices 
which control delegations of power to the Union. 
Free and fair elections to executive and legislative 
office at the Union level 
How far can representatives elected by the people require 
all public bodies to justify their actions and exercise 
ultimate controlling power over them? 
Effective national parliamentary scrutiny and control of powers 
delegated to the Union. 
A European Parliament scrutinises and controls of 
the powers of other Union institutions. 
How far does competition for the people’s vote structure 
voter choice in ways that allow citizens to  exercise public 
control as equals? 
National party competition allows citizens to exercise control over 
delegations of power to the Union 
Parties structure voter choice so that elections to EU 
offices can be used to exercise control over Union 
decisions 
How plural and independent are social groups, organised 
interests and communications media that seeks to 
influence the polity? How equal is their access to public 
institutions? 
A wide range of national civil society actors seeks to influence 
Union policy, and the equality of their access. 
A wide range of pan-European civil society actors 
organised to influence EU decisions 
How far are the decisions of the polity deliberated within a 
public sphere that allows all points of view to be 
considered, justified and decided in relation to all others, 
free of inequalities in power and resources? 
Each Member State is a well-formed public sphere where all 
points of view have equal access to national procedures for 
controlling delegations of power to the EU 
The EU is itself a public sphere in which all views on 
the exercise of its powers are considered and 
justified in relation to one another on a basis of 
equality 
How far and how equally do citizens a) trust one another 
and b) enjoy civic capabilities needed to exercise public 
control, and demand and receive justifications? 
Citizens have all the knowledge they need to make  informed 
choices in using national procedures to control delegations of 
power to the EU 
Citizens have all the knowledge they need to make 
informed choices in elections to executive and 
legislative office at the Union level. 
How far are democratic majorities constrained by a rule of 
law that is no more constraining than is necessary to 
protect the process of majority formation itself? 
National procedures for controlling delegations of power to the 
EU are covered by rule of law principles in all Member States 
The European Union develops its own rule of law 
principles 
How far is the polity accepted as a unit that can use 
democratic procedures to make collecively binding 
decisions? 
Delegations of power to the Union are adequately authorized and 
controlled by national demoi 
Pan-European majorities are accepted as binding 
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